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ABSTRACT
This article argues that a theory of human needs is essential to buttress and give content to
the concept of consumption corridors. In particular it enables us to, first, define a safe, just,
and sustainable space for humanity, and second, to decompose and recompose consump-
tion based on a distinction between necessities and luxuries. After an introduction, the art-
icle is divided into four parts. The first compares different concepts of human needs and
concentrates on universalizable need theories. The second presents a method for agreeing
on contextual need satisfiers, and the third discusses current research identifying the floors
of poverty and necessities. A fourth section then sets out how sustainable needs can under-
pin the upper bound of the corridor and how this ceiling might be measured in income and
consumption terms. However, once we move from a national to a global perspective a pro-
found dilemma is encountered as rich country corridors diverge from a global consump-
tion corridor.
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Introduction
To achieve a safe and just space for humanity
(Raworth 2017) requires addressing not only basic
needs, minimum incomes, and necessities, but also
riches, luxuries, and maximum incomes. In the lan-
guage of Di Giulio and Fuchs (2014), we must pur-
sue the idea of a sustainable “consumption corridor”
(CC) between minimum standards, allowing every
individual to live a satisfactory life, and maximum
standards, ensuring a limit on every individual’s use
of natural and social resources in order to guarantee
a good life for others in the present and in the
future. Put this way, the justification for the floor
and the ceiling differs: the floor is derived from a
social idea of wellbeing and the ceiling is derived
from an ecological principle of planetary sustainabil-
ity. However, this distinction is qualified by two
subsidiary arguments. First, restricting excessive
consumption can actually enhance eudaimonic, and
possibly hedonic, features of wellbeing. Second,
minimum consumption bundles will also need to be
as environmentally undemanding as is technic-
ally possible.
The CC approach is based on at least five prior
assumptions, which are also at the heart of my
recent book Heat, Greed and Human Need
(Gough 2017).
First, “eco-efficiency” – decoupling economic
activity from planetary damage – while essential, can-
not be enough. The vast scale of the decoupling
required, and the tiny timescale within which it must
be achieved, rule this out as the sole means of transi-
tion to a sustainable economy. This is especially the
case for greenhouse-gas emissions (GHG). The dom-
inant paradigm of green growth is unachievable.
Second, all transitions to a zero-carbon economy
must be equitable and just. In a world where the
emissions of the top 1% – some 70 million people –
roughly equate with those of the bottom half of the
world’s population – some 3.8 billion people –
issues of distribution are central to sustainable well-
being. There is a double injustice between the
groups responsible for and the groups suffering
from climate change.
Third, attention must be focused on consumption
in the rich world. Globalization since 1980 has out-
sourced much production from the North to the
global East and South, resulting in a mismatch
between production-based and consumption-based
emissions. The widespread practice of measuring
countries’ emissions on a territorial basis signifi-
cantly underestimates the planetary demands of the
rich nations. The CC approach refocuses our atten-
tion on the hidden impacts of rich country
consumption.
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Fourth, consequently personal consumption
becomes an issue of social engagement and public
policy. If the environmental impacts of rich country
consumption must be restrained in a just and equit-
able way, then a new discourse and policy frame-
work becomes necessary – that of recomposing
consumption. This cuts across the traditional
administrative territories of economic, social, and
environmental policy. It requires new forms of eco-
social policy.
Fifth, this entails challenging orthodox economic
consumer theory and the ideology of consumer sov-
ereignty. In particular, the earlier distinctions
between necessities and luxuries come back to the
fore, but with an added intermediate category. To
make such distinctions requires an entirely new
framework for thinking about consumption.
This article argues that a theory of human needs
is essential to buttress and give content to these
assumptions, notably in defining equity and justice
(Points 2 and 3) and in decomposing and recom-
posing consumption (Points 4 and 5). It is divided
into four parts, the first develops an approach to
conceptualizing universal human needs. The second
sketches a methodology, the dual strategy, for iden-
tifying need satisfiers in particular contexts. The
third describes some current research to identify the
lower bounds of the CC. The fourth then confronts
the more difficult task – how needs and sustainabil-
ity can help conceptualize and measure the upper
bound of the CC. The conclusion then discusses the
resulting dilemma between a “rich national” and a
global CC.
Figure 1 sets out my framework and in the pro-
cess anticipates parts of my argument. It distin-
guishes three domains within which inequality can
be conceived: those of wellbeing, consumption, and
income/wealth. Within each we can distinguish
three parallel categories, and two dividing lines – a
floor and a ceiling.
A sustainable CC is illustrated by the zone
between the floor and the ceiling, shown in gray. In
wellbeing terms, it is designed to foster flourishing
(Robeyns 2018), bounded by a floor of sufficiency
and a ceiling that recognizes a flattening out of any
further benefit to wellbeing. In terms of income and
wealth it aims at prosperity (Jackson 2009) by
providing an adequate floor but avoiding “riches.”
The CC approach is concerned with the middle col-
umn – consumption being one consequence of
income/wealth and one input into wellbeing. The
goal here is to ensure that all necessities are pro-
vided and above them a range of comfort goods or,
to use Juliet Schor’s (2010) concept, a state of
“plenitude.” Needs theory supplies insights in the
wellbeing domain and, via the idea of need satisfiers,
in the consumption domain, which in turn has
implications for the distribution of income
and wealth.
Needs theory
The literature on human needs and wellbeing is
ancient and vast, going back to at least Aristotle and
the Buddha. Philosophers from distinct schools of
thought – economists, psychologists, sociologists,
poverty researchers, development studies specialists,
theologians, and many others – have contributed to
debates on the nature of human needs, how to
measure them and how to enhance their satisfaction
(for surveys see Alkire 2002; Dover 2016; Dean
2020). It is not surprising that such a history has
thrown up much variation and debate. Hartley Dean
(2020) in his glossary of adjectives preceding the
word “needs” identifies a total of 39, including:
absolute, basic, common, cultural, discursive, exist-
ential, instrumental, intermediate, material, norma-
tive, objective, ontological, real, relative, social,
subjective, thick, thin, and universal.
However, within this mosaic we can identify
some common elements. All accounts of needs pur-
port to provide a reasoned, objective, and disaggre-
gated conception of human wellbeing. They reject
single, usually monetary, measures in favor of “lists”
of components. The assumption is that these com-
ponents are not substitutable: they have merit and
contribute to wellbeing in their own right (though
some combinations of needs can be complemen-
tary). The approach is “objective” in the sense that
collective reasoning is applied to understand needs
and wellbeing. Mental feelings can be included in
the list, but the focus is on functionings,
not feelings.
For example, Manfred Max-Neef (1989, 1992)
has, with his associates in Chile, developed a popu-
lar “matrix of need” comprising nine axiological
needs (subsistence, protection, affection, understand-
ing, participation, leisure, creation, identity, free-
dom) and four existential needs (being, having,
doing, interacting). The 36 components of the
matrix have proved fruitful in fostering participation
in often poor communities and in elaborating “need
satisfiers” in developing and developed countries
Wellbeing Domain Consumpon Domain Income/Wealth Domain
Excess Luxuries Riches
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. Ceiling
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flourishing Plenitude, Comfort Goods Prosperity
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sufficiency Necessies Adequacy Floor
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deprivaon Lack of Necessies Poverty
Figure 1. Floors and Ceilings in three Domains.
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(Guillen-Royo 2016). His distinction between needs
and need satisfiers has entered the lexicon of need
theory. However, the derivation of his categories
remains difficult to discern (see Alkire 2002, 61).
The idea of human needs can serve many pur-
poses, but our task here is to identify how it can
contribute to the notion of sustainable consumption
and consumption corridors. The central feature
here, I argue, is universalizability. Environmental
limits will progressively impose dilemmas of inter-
national and intergenerational equity, so to be useful
any theory should be universalizable across both
space and time. The concept of human needs should
display commonalities across cultures and
generations.
For this reason, I concentrate here on two philo-
sophical theories of human need which explicitly
address this issue: our own – Doyal and Gough
(1991) and Gough (2015), and that of Martha
Nussbaum (1993, 2000). Though using different
concepts – needs and capabilities – both approaches
have the goal of developing a genuinely universal
argument for human emancipation. Both critique
cultural relativism, and draw strong normative con-
clusions that prioritize meeting needs over culturally
specific wants or preferences (Gough 2014). Both
begin with the individual, recognizing that “each
person has just one life to live” (Nussbaum 2000,
56). But both recognize the social dimension of
individual agency: individual needs can never be sat-
isfied independently of the social environment, but
they must be conceptualized independently of any
social environment. Also, both address the dilemma
put by Soper (1993). “In general, the less informa-
tion a ‘thin’ theory provides, the less controversial it
will be, but also the more difficult to draw on as a
guide to policy formation.” To begin with, therefore,
I concentrate on these two approaches.
Doyal and Gough: theory of human need
Our theory was published in 1991 (Doyal and
Gough 1991) and has been elaborated subsequently
(Doyal 1995; Gough 2000, 2015). It built on the
prior work of scholars such as David Wiggins (1987,
2005) and David Braybrooke (1987) and has been
added to and developed by subsequent scholars,
such as Des Gasper (1996, 2009), Gillian Brock
(2009), and John O’Neill (2011). Holden et al. (2018)
provide a concise summary. In essence, human needs
are universal. All individuals, everywhere in the
world, at all times present and future, have certain
basic needs. These must be met in order for people
to avoid harm, to participate in society, and to reflect
critically upon the conditions in which they find
themselves. This is not the same as subjective feelings
like anxiety or unhappiness. It refers to functions,
not feelings.
The method adopted in A Theory of Human
Need derives common human needs in two stages:
the first presenting a “thin” theory and the second
“thickening” it out. The first stage is based on a
neo-Kantian argument. Doyal and Gough (1991,
52–54) contend that
Kant showed that for individuals to act and to be
responsible they must have both the physical and
mental capacity to do so: at the very least a body
which is alive and which is governed by all of the
relevant causal processes and the mental
competence to deliberate and to choose. Let us
identify this latter capacity for choice with the
existence of the most basic level of personal
“autonomy”…To be autonomous in this minimal
sense is to have the ability to make informed
choices about what should be done and how to go
about doing it. This entails being able to formulate
aims, and beliefs about how to achieve them, along
with the ability to evaluate the success of beliefs in
the light of empirical evidence… It makes sense,
therefore, to claim that since physical survival and
personal autonomy are the conditions for any
individual action in any culture, they constitute the
most basic human needs – those which must be
satisfied to some degree before actors can
participate in their form of life to achieve any other
valued goals.
At a second stage, we distinguish a subset of uni-
versal satisfier characteristics: those characteristics of
need satisfiers which apply to all cultures. Universal
satisfier characteristics are thus those properties of
goods, services, activities, and relationships which
enhance physical health and human autonomy in all
cultures. For example, calories a day for a specified
group of people constitutes a characteristic of
(most) foodstuffs which has transcultural relevance.
Similarly, “shelter from the elements” and
“protection from disease-carrying vectors” are two
of the characteristics which all dwellings aim to
have in common (though to greatly varying
degrees). This list of intermediate needs is derived
from two principle scientific sources. First, they are
based on the best available scientific/technical know-
ledge articulating causal relationships between phys-
ical health or autonomy and other factors. Second,
they are predicated on comparative anthropological
knowledge about practices in the numerous cultures
and subcultures, states, and political systems in the
contemporary world. Thus, to begin with it is the
codified knowledge of the natural and social sciences
that enable determination of the composition of
intermediate needs. This knowledge changes and
typically expands – today often at dizzying speeds –
through time.
Thus, the first stage uses neo-Kantian arguments
to develop a thin theory of human need. It
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deliberately seeks, so to speak, the lowest common
denominator of universalizable preconditions for
human action and social participation. In this way,
we would claim, the potential for cross-cultural con-
sensus is heightened. At the second stage, we appeal
to collective knowledge, from both the natural and
the social sciences, to identify the prerequisites for
healthy and autonomous persons across different
cultures. Against much postmodern skepticism we
retain a belief in the potential of the scientific com-
munity to approximate a consensus on the prerequi-
sites for human flourishing, albeit one that
continually evolves over time.
Kate Soper (1993) concurs: “What [Doyal and
Gough’s] work shows, they would argue, is that you
can chart basic need satisfaction for ‘objective’ wel-
fare without either embracing relativism or operat-
ing at such a level of generality that the pertinence
of the theory for specific problems concerning social
policy is sacrificed.”
Martha Nussbaum
Martha Nussbaum has worked within the capability
tradition, but disagrees with Amartya Sen in several
significant ways. In particular, she is content, unlike
Sen, to identify a core list of “central human func-
tional capabilities” with many affinities to the idea
of human needs (Gough 2014). Nussbaum first went
back to Aristotle to derive a list of “central
functionings.” Following the method in
Nicomachean Ethics, she identified “spheres of
human experience that figure in more or less any
human life, and in which more or less any human
being will have to make some choices rather than
others” and to each of which there is a correspond-
ing virtue (Nussbaum 1993, 245). This generated a
slightly varying list of 10–11 spheres of experience.
The approach identified “a core idea of the human
being as a dignified free being who shapes his or
her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with
others…A life that is really human is one that is
shaped throughout by these human powers of prac-
tical reason and sociability’ (Nussbaum 2000, 72;
my italics).
During the 1990s, she developed a more norma-
tive or Rawlsian procedure in Women and Human
Development (WHD) (Nussbaum, 2000). The central
capabilities are first identified in an approach
informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy
of human dignity. These are then presented as the
source of political principles for a liberal, pluralistic
society, free of any metaphysical grounding. The list
is modified as a result of cross-cultural academic
discussion and discussions within women’s groups.
As a result, the central capabilities can become the
object of an “overlapping consensus” among people
who may otherwise have very different conceptions
of the good. The argument from principle at stage
one is “envisaged as a first step in the process of
reaching toward such a reflective equilibrium”
(Nussbaum 2000, 76, 151, my italics).
Nussbaum claims that her approach entails a
two-stage and iterative method: a core philosophical
idea derived from Aristotle is examined in cross-cul-
tural dialogues, revised, and resubmitted in an itera-
tive fashion. This suggests that there exists a
potential bridge between the normative and the con-
sensual stages in the shaping of an agreed list of
human capabilities, though normative argument
has priority.
In her later book, Frontiers of Justice, she relies
heavily on the language of need: “human need is a
relatively stable matter, and thus there is some hope
that we can give an account of basic human needs
that will remain reasonably constant over time… the
idea of what human beings need for fully human
living is among the most vivid intuitive ideas we
share” (Nussbaum, 2006, 278, 279). Brock concludes
that her capability approach is then derivative of the
need approach. “The notion of need is a valuable
member of the team of concepts widely used in dis-
cussions of global justice, both in the capabilities
and the human rights approaches. The case for these
is often built on the more fundamental concept of
needs” (Brock, 2009, 73–74).
However, Nussbaum makes one important quali-
fication by embracing the distinction, which she
shares with Sen, between functionings and capabil-
ities. She writes that “[w]here adult citizens are con-
cerned, capability not functioning is the appropriate
political goal.” This permits universal goals to be
identified yet individuals’ rights not to pursue them
to be given due weight. Fasting is not the same as
starving; nor is celibacy the same as enforced sexual
abstinence. (By contrast, children may require
enforced protection of and stimulation of their capa-
bilities, for example through compulsory education.)
The “functioning-capability” distinction would help
us to diminish lingering charges of paternalism
since adult individuals should always have an elem-
ent of choice over whether to pursue these goals
(see Gough 2014).
With this qualification I continue to advocate
and use the Doyal-Gough and the related Nussbaum
approach to identify the universal needs that all
people share, including future generations of people.
The three core needs are, in the language of
Nussbaum and Doyal-Gough, respectively: affili-
ation/participation, bodily integrity/health, and prac-
tical reason/autonomy. The universality of need is
of great importance to issues of sustainable
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consumption since environmental limits will pro-
gressively impose dilemmas of intergenerational
equity. We can assert with considerable confidence
that the basic needs of future generations of humans
will be the same as those of present humans.
Compared to the indeterminacy of future genera-
tions’ preferences or happiness – or of Sen’s capabil-
ities – a theory of need provides some firm
foundations on which to construct a CC.
Defining need satisfiers: the dual strategy
One agreed feature of all approaches is that univer-
sal needs differ from specific need satisfiers which
are variable and local. Need satisfiers comprise the
goods, services, activities, and relationships that con-
tribute to need satisfaction in any particular context.
The needs for food and shelter apply to all peoples,
but there exist wide varieties of cuisines and forms
of dwelling that can meet any given specification of
nutrition and protection from the elements.
Without a sharp distinction between universal needs
and specific satisfiers, all need theories could justly
be accused of being paternalist, intrusive, and
insensitive to context and culture.
It is clear that in drawing up a CC we are working
in the domain of need satisfiers, not universal needs.
Thus, the components of the corridors will vary
according to economic, social, ecological, cultural, and
political contexts. But how might such minima and
maxima be identified and agreed – especially in an
unequal commodified society with a strong ideology
of consumer sovereignty like our own? Can a demo-
cratic consensus ever be achieved around such con-
tentious questions? My answer is to develop a general
methodology – the dual strategy – and then apply it,
in turn, to the lower and upper limits of the CC.
The broad methodology to identify need satisfiers
in particular contexts is to draw on two forms of
knowledge: the codified knowledge of experts and the
experientially grounded knowledge of ordinary people
in everyday lives. The process to combine the two
can be called the dual strategy (Doyal and Gough
1991, Chap. 14; Nussbaum 2000; Gough 2014).
The codified knowledge of the natural and social
sciences enables us to determine the composition of
many need satisfiers. It is embodied in the know-
ledge of practical experts, whether in health and
medicine, engineering or biology, technology or pol-
icy science, and this knowledge is commonly used
to help identify “what people need”: the components
of a healthy diet, the education needs of children,
the damage to our environment from pollutants,
and so on. Experts have a vital role to play in iden-
tifying need satisfiers. Experientially grounded or
practical knowledge is the entire range of
understandings and accumulated problem solving of
people in their everyday lives and contexts. This too
must contribute to deciding what objects, activities,
and relationships are necessary or essential for well-
being in any given context. Policies that ignore this
input can be irrelevant, inefficient, stupid, or
oppressive; for example, building new housing
estates far from employment, shops, or social activ-
ities without public transport and concentrating
poor families within them.
We thus conclude that any rational and effective
attempt to resolve disputes over need satisfiers “must
bring to bear both the codified knowledge of experts
and the experiential knowledge of those whose basic
needs and daily life world are under consideration. It
requires a dual strategy of policy formation which val-
ues compromise, provided that it does not extend to
the general character of basic human needs and
rights” (Doyal and Gough 1991, 141). In the real
world interests, institutions, and power imbalances
will thwart it. In implementing the dual strategy one
can only insist, following Habermas (1987), that the
debate is as informed, participatory, and free of
vested interests as is possible.
This bears some resemblance to the methodology
developed by Antonietta Di Giulio and Rico Defila
(2019a, 2019b, 2020) to operationalize the concept
of CCs in Switzerland. They do so by defining a set
of “Protected Needs” and test its acceptability with a
sample of the Swiss population.1 To develop the list,
they draw on existing codified knowledge: theoret-
ical approaches and cross-national inquiries into
various aspects of wellbeing, and an interdisciplinary
group of German and Swiss scholars to discuss these
ideas and exclude anything revealed to be possibly
biased. To simulate a deliberative form of politics
they then devise a questionnaire where a large rep-
resentative sample of Swiss citizens is confronted
with a series of polar opposing views on beliefs cru-
cial to the concept of CCs and asked to place them-
selves within these extremes. They find a net
positive consent to two critical positions: the entitle-
ment of government to limit individual freedoms to
achieve social justice and the need to adopt a
“sufficiency strategy” to ensure that future genera-
tions can satisfy their needs. They recognize that the
results apply only to Switzerland where the climate
of political discourse is relatively consensual.
There are today a range of experiments in forms
of dialogic democracy, such as discussion forums,
citizens’ juries, and visioning exercises. But most of
these undertakings are exercises in consultation, not
proper participatory decision making. To make pro-
gress some ways must be found of scaling up these
initiatives while at the same time attending to power
differences and distortions of debate. In particular,
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elements of participatory democracy must be com-
bined with representative democracy; for example,
findings could be presented to and negotiated with
councilors and parliamentarians, aiming to arrive at
a broad consensus (Coote 2015).
A notable recent development has been citizens’
assemblies where a sample of lay members selected
to represent a broad cross-section of the population
considers and discusses over an extended period evi-
dence with experts and then draws up conclusions
based on consensus. Examples include the Ireland
assembly convened between 2016 and 2018, which
among other things resulted in a referendum that
legalized abortion. I return to the recent Citizens’
Convention on Climate in France below.
The lower boundary: defining material
necessities in practice
There is now a strong body of research which finds
a rough consensus on the bundle of need satisfiers
required for a decent minimum standard of living
in different countries and times (Niemietz 2010;
Deeming 2011).2 Since Peter Townsend’s work on
poverty (1979), there has been wide acceptance that
this minimum includes more than just food, cloth-
ing, and shelter; it is about having the opportunities
and choices necessary to participate effectively in
society. None of this research follows strictly the
dual strategy methodology, but I consider here two
contrasting examples: the Reference Budget
Framework (RBF) developed since 2011 in Antwerp
for the European Union (EU) and the Minimum
Income Standard (MIS) developed in Loughborough
and applied since 2008 in the UK.
The European Reference Budgets network has
developed a common methodology to identify refer-
ence budgets, or priced baskets of goods and services
that represent adequate standards of living. The
research draws on the Doyal-Gough theory and meth-
odology, but it modifies the dual strategy approach by
giving priority to “domain experts” who first define
the key consumption bundles, on which focus groups
of citizens then deliberate. This RBF is now the rec-
ommended format for evaluating decent living stand-
ards across all 27 member states (Storms et al 2013).
The earlier and still running UK research uses
citizen-focus groups to determine a MIS (Davis et al
2014, 2015). The focus groups, advised in a light
touch way by various experts, are tasked with pro-
ducing an extensive list of items that households
would need in order to reach “an acceptable min-
imum standard of living.” The 2014 MIS study in
the UK involved twelve focus groups including pen-
sioners, working-age adults without children, and
parents with children. This exercise has resulted in a
relatively unchanging consensus. For example, the
parents group, recognizing that it was increasingly
likely that children in social housing would be
expected to share bedrooms, concluded that this was
not a standard that they agreed with; they felt that
in general the minimum should include a bedroom
for each child of school age. Necessary food expen-
ditures were agreed to be higher than present aver-
ages due to the consumption of more fresh fruit
and vegetables.
The consensus has shifted a bit over time. In ear-
lier years all groups decided that owning any car
was not a necessity, but in 2014 the group discus-
sing the needs of households with children decided
that an inexpensive secondhand car was a necessity
for the first time, due to the decline of public trans-
port. By 2014 all groups, including the pensioners
group, regarded a computer, Internet access, and a
cheap mobile-phone subscription as a necessity. But,
these apart, the definition of necessities has changed
relatively slowly: the UK 2014 budgets were remark-
ably similar to the 2008 budgets, despite the finan-
cial crisis and recession in the meantime, reflecting
a consistency in the ways that members of the pub-
lic interpreted the rationales of necessity.
Both the RBF and MIS have in common that a
consensus is achieved on a complex bundle of goods
and services deemed to ensure an adequate min-
imum standard of consumption. Neither is con-
cerned directly with income levels, but the bundles
of goods and services can then be priced to calculate
minimum income lines. They differ in the respective
role of experts and citizens – the former lead in the
EU research, the latter in the UK research – but nei-
ther properly respects the need for informed citizen
debate enjoined by the dual strategy. Lengthy citi-
zen’s assemblies might have more potential, as dis-
cussed below.
The upper bound: devising a consumption
ceiling
Returning to Figure 1, we can consider a ceiling to
the CC in three separate domains – wellbeing, con-
sumption, and income/wealth/resources. I will look
at each, turning to consumption last, drawing out
the links with the concept of human needs.
Wellbeing
There are two fundamental arguments for limits to
inequality: biophysical and ethico-social (Daly 1977;
Koch and Mont 2016; Gough 2017). The science of
entropy, finitude, and ecological interdependence
points to a series of planetary limits. At the same
time, our obligations to the poor of the world, to
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future generations, and to other species calls for
ethico-social limits to growth.
Ethico-social arguments for limits to inequality
range widely. Thorstein Veblen (1899) showed how
inequality increases status competition and under-
mines wellbeing in society, an argument restated
with cross-national evidence by Wilkinson and
Pickett in The Spirit Level (2009). Hirsch’s (1977)
analysis of the endless search for positional goods
provides another argument for social limits to
growth. Related to this, inequality hinders collective
action and forces short-term time horizons on lower
income groups (see Gough 2015, 2017). This case
has been buttressed in recent decades by eudai-
monic psychology, in particular self-determination
theory and its identification of universal psycho-
logical needs for competence, autonomy, and
relatedness. More competitive, materialist, and
unequal economic systems undermine the ability of
people to flourish in their vocational, social, and cul-
tural pursuits (Ryan and Sapp 2007; Kasser 2011).
More recently Ingrid Robeyns (2018, 2019) advo-
cates “non-intrinsic limitarianism” – the belief that it
is not permissible to have more resources than are
needed to fully flourish in life. Riches are, by defin-
ition, surplus to flourishing. This enables her to argue
for a maximum level of resources in order to devote
surplus resources to meet “urgent unmet needs.” She
claims that “since surplus money does not contribute
to people’s prosperity, it has zero moral weight, and
it is unreasonable to reject the principle that we
ought to use that money to meet these urgent unmet
needs.” “Limitarianism claims that one can theoretic-
ally construct a riches line and that a world in which
no one would be above the riches line would be a
better world” (2019, 253, 258).
Ecological limits played a minor role in her first
paper, but her second paper recognized the responsibil-
ity of the rich for past and present GHG emissions
and this provides a powerful reason to allocate their
surplus resources for climate action. “The surplus
money of the superrich cannot be used to enhance
their wellbeing; it could be more beneficial if it were
invested wisely in climate action strategies” (Robeyns
2019, 259, my italics). This echoes the central argu-
ments in my book (Gough 2017): In the Anthropocene
meeting people’s basic needs should be the first priority
of justice and the obligations of the rich to cut emis-
sions and bear the burdens of adaptation and mitiga-
tion are agreed by almost all ethical principles.
Income/wealth/resources
The second dimension is that of income and wealth
or economic resources more broadly (see Buch-
Hansen and Koch 2019 for a survey). Herman Daly
(1977) was an early advocate of a maximum income
as part of a steady state economy. “If you have a
limited total, and you also have a minimum income,
then that implies a maximum somewhere” (Daly
2018, 90). Jan Drewnowski (1978) was an early pro-
ponent of an “affluence line” above which consump-
tion need not and should not rise. Calls for
thresholds or ratios to limit inequality of resources
can be traced back to classical philosophers and
continue to the present day.3 But though welcome,
all such ratios are arbitrary (Concialdi 2018).
Not until 2006 was a method developed to relate
a maximum income to the minimum income line.
Medeiros (2006) began by assuming a consensual
minimum income and an estimate of the societal
“poverty gap” – what sum of money it would take
to move everyone above the poverty threshold. He
then proposed a hypothetical step-by-step system of
transferring money to pay for the poverty gap start-
ing with the richest person. The income level where
the sum raised equaled the poverty gap would then
indicate the affluence line. Concialdi (2018) points
out that the higher the minimum income the lower
would be the affluence line, hence the minimum
line must be based on calculations of the decent
minimum income discussed above.4 Using this
method Hirsch (2017) estimates the annual sum
required to bring everybody up to the MIS line in
the UK at £49 billion or 2.6% of gross domestic
product (GDP) at the time. This implies a riches
line of about £150,000 per person per year. If all
untaxed incomes above this rate were taxed at 100%
it would annually raise approximately £48 billion.
This riches line has some intuitive plausibility: it is
the income at which the top rate of tax commences,
and is the salary of the UK Prime Minister.
Consumption
Finally, I return to the dimension of consumption
and the idea of a maximum “consumption bundle”
of goods and services in affluent societies. As far as I
am aware there has been no exploration using the
dual strategy methodology of what constitute luxu-
ries, or a consumption level that is “too much.” A
representative sample of the Dutch population, when
presented with various scenarios of amenities and
consumption items, felt that at some point additional
income or wealth would not improve wellbeing. For
example, 67% considered that the following was
above the riches line: “a household that has a villa
with private swimming pool, two luxury cars, a house
in southern France, and 500,000 EUR in assets” (but
one third did not). The study also found that
respondents were very reluctant to support a max-
imum wage, a maximum wealth limit, or caps on
savings or inherited wealth (Robeyns 2019).
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Using focus-group methods, Davis et al (2020)
undertook an exploratory pilot to study whether pub-
lic consensus can identify a “riches line” in London.
The researchers were well aware that identifying a
threshold at which people could be considered to be
“rich” is a complex and less well explored concept
than a poverty or minimum income line, and devised
their strategy carefully. Six groups comprising people
from different income brackets considered how to
evaluate consumption levels above the MIS level. The
groups were guided by a facilitator with some infor-
mation provided in a light touch way – but there
was no engagement with experts as such. The partici-
pants agreed on a framework consisting of five levels:
E: Super-rich
D: Wealthy, affluent, rich
C: Well-off; securely comfortable
B: Surviving comfortably
A: Minimum socially acceptable standard
The crucial dividing line for our purposes is
between C and D. Participants described individuals
and households at level C as “comfortable,” “well
off.” or “flourishing.” They then considered what it
means to be above this level, and whether there was
a point beyond which additional income and/or
wealth becomes unnecessary, excessive, or
socially harmful.
There was considerable consensus on the D level,
often described as “luxury” or “wealthy living.”
Common consumption indicators of this level
included a second property (whether in the UK or
abroad), a wealth manager and significant savings,
eating out weekly (with £100 wine), “more expen-
sive hobbies” (riding, sailing, antiques), club mem-
bership; five or more holidays a year (some without
children), a second car,5 private health insurance, a
personal trainer, and a housekeeper.
This pilot research found considerable consensus on
some of the components of a riches line (though no
attempt was made to attach a money measure to it). It
demonstrated a collective approach to achieve some
consensus in this emotive area. However, as in the
Dutch study, there was no normative consensus on
whether such riches were morally desirable or undesir-
able, or on what might be done to reduce inequality.
The ecological ceiling
Unfortunately, none of these income or consump-
tion studies of ceilings, to my knowledge, take into
account pressing ecological limits. I discuss here two
potential ways forward, using solely measures to
mitigate and adapt to dangerous levels of climate
change (leaving aside all other planetary boundaries
and their potential threats to human wellbeing). The
first targets income and the second consumption.
First, the Medeiros approach could be modified
to take into account the resources required to
achieve a safe future climate. These can be divided
into two parts: (1) the domestic investments needed
to reduce GHG emissions immediately in rich coun-
tries at the ferocious rate required to avoid climatic
disaster and (2) the transfers needed to ensure
developing countries can attain a sustainable path of
development while also improving levels of need
satisfaction. This approach would endorse Robeyns’
proposal to extend the idea of “unmet needs”
beyond domestic income in three radical directions:
The condition of extreme global poverty; the condi-
tion of local or global disadvantage; and the condi-
tion of urgent collective action problems (Robeyns
2018, 10–11). If these sums could be estimated then
the Medeiros transfers to finance them would have
to rise meaning the maximum income line in rich
countries would be lowered.6
A second much more meaningful route would be
to run expanded, more demanding citizens’ assem-
blies, where sustainability experts provide indicators
of the carbon and GHG footprints of different con-
sumption items to inform and guide citizen discus-
sions on what was and was not sustainable.
Fortunately, we have a real-life example in the French
Citizens’ Convention on Climate, which reported in
June 2020. Comprising 150 randomly selected but
representative citizens, the Convention met for nine
months. It was tasked to decide on policies to achieve
a reduction of at least 40% of France’s GHG emissions
by 2030. The French government committed from the
start to put forward the Convention’s proposals for
legal adoption – without changes – via referendum,
parliamentary vote, or executive order. This is an
unprecedented commitment for a citizen’s assembly
and makes it a leading example of introducing dia-
logic democracy into determining climate action.7
The Convention agreed on 149 proposals, some of
which have a bearing on CC. These include the fast
and mandatory retrofit of the least energy efficient
buildings by 2030, the implementation of a ban on
high-emission vehicles by 2025, the mandate to dis-
play GHG emissions in retail and consumer places
and in advertisements for brands and developing a
carbon scorecard, the prohibition on the advertising
of high GHG products, and the imposition of limits
on the use of heating and air conditioning in housing,
public spaces and buildings, commercial and indus-
trial buildings (maximum average temperature of
19 C, no air-conditioning below 25 C). The
Convention rejected some proposals, including
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reducing the working week from 35 to 28 hours. Most
proposals, as expected, were “green growth” initiatives
to decouple emissions from production and consump-
tion, but the list above illustrates that recomposing
consumption also entered the agenda.
The global dilemma
However, the Convention did not and could not
engage with the global dimensions of the climate
crisis and the ensuing implications for consumption
and emission levels in the West. The frame of refer-
ence – a 40% cut in French territorial emissions
over the coming decade – though radical does not
take account of consumption-based emissions.
France like all nations in the global North emits
more in consuming goods than it does in producing
them (Gough 2017). What is more, even at min-
imum decent standards of living Northern consum-
ers far exceed any global targets of emissions per
head. If everyone in the UK overnight cut their con-
sumption to the Loughborough minimum income
standard discussed above, emissions would be
reduced by “only” 37% (Druckman and Jackson
2010). The UK now generates on average of 8.9
tons of consumption-based carbon-dioxide (CO2)
emissions per person (Jackson 2019). Assuming the
same ratio applied today then a “bare necessities”
Briton would still be emitting 5.6 tons CO2 per per-
son. The distinction drawn above between luxuries
and necessities within a rich country like Britain is
relevant to domestic policy but seems quite irrele-
vant to global policy, where over one billion lack
energy for cleaning, sanitation and water supply,
lighting, and basic livelihood tasks (Rao and
Pachauri 2017).
This gulf raises profound questions concerning
global justice. Notwithstanding the consensus and
mobilization around the sustainable development
goals (SDGs) since 2015, the case for absolute cuts
in consumption in the rich world, and for both sub-
stantial global transfers, is strong yet difficult to
envisage, since no institutional body exists to pro-
mote or deliver these outcomes. It would imply
some form of “contract and converge,” first pro-
posed by the Global Commons Institute in the early
1990s. This concept consists of reducing overall
GHG emissions to a safe level (contraction), result-
ing from every country bringing its emissions per
capita to a level which is equal for all countries
(convergence) (Stott 2006). The agreed contraction
goal is now zero net carbon by 2050 or preferably
considerably earlier. The convergence route to this
objective is still unclear though it implies prodigious
cuts in consumption-generated emissions in the
developed world. The UK’s total consumption
emissions in 2018 were around 0.6 billion tons,
implying that its fair carbon budget would be
exhausted in just five years (Jackson 2019).
Yet to move quickly to a target of even two tons of
consumption-based emissions per head within existing
socio-technical structures would deprive citizens of a
vast range of goods and services – housing standards,
cars, imported foods, a range of clothing, relatively
nutritious diets, and so forth – that they have agreed
are necessary for effective participation in modern life
(as demonstrated in the previous section). Since such
global disparities cannot be eliminated overnight or
even over a decade, this implies two distinct minimum
lines: one to ensure participation and a decent min-
imum standard of living in rich nations such as the
UK, and a second to ensure a decent minimum gener-
alizable to all humanity. Current research is starting to
detail what this package of global necessities might
comprise (Rao and Min 2018; O’Neill et al 2018). Each
of these two lines could in principle be attached to two
maximum income lines in rich countries using the
Medeiros methodology. But at this point the CC
approach would need to form one component of a
wider strategy for global decarbonization.
Conclusions
A theory of human needs provides powerful norma-
tive support for sufficiency, for prioritizing needs
over excessive wants, and for distributing resources
more equally. These merits are all strengthened in
the presence of dire anthropic pressures on the
planet. The safe and just space for humanity is
being squeezed. The zone between the upper and
lower limits of the CC is shrinking fast. In this way,
some notion of universal human needs provides a
firm philosophical foundation for the idea of a CC.
The first part of this article summarized the neces-
sary ingredients of such a theory. The second section
turned our attention to need satisfiers and proposed a
methodology for seeking a democratic consensus on
necessary satisfiers. The third section summarized
some existing research on the lower bound of the CC.
The longer fourth section then turned to the more dif-
ficult and open question of the upper bound, distin-
guishing argument and evidence for a maximum or
ceiling in the domains of wellbeing, income/wealth,
and consumption. In each case, the argument is related
back to human needs. The conclusion is that the con-
cept of a CC continues to play an essential role in
bridging the gap between green growth and degrowth.
However, once the focus is shifted from within a
rich nation state to the global arena a fundamental
dilemma is revealed: the consumption bundle
required to achieve an acceptable level of participa-
tion in a modern society far exceeds the ecological
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bounds for a safe planet. This points to two CCs: a
high income “internal” CC and a CC for high-
income countries within a global context of great
inequality. Making this clear and operationalizing the
mismatch would at least contribute to a transitional
contract and converge strategy. Policy making on
CCs could contribute here by considering how neces-
sities are provisioned, which “comfort goods” may
not be sustainable, and first and foremost how luxury
consumption can be diminished to free up resources
for the poorest both at home and abroad.
Notes
1. “Protected needs” are defined as needs in which
governments and other collective actors have an
obligation to provide the preconditions for their
satisfaction. Di Giulio and Defila note that some
needs could not form a legitimate obligation of
government, for example a need to be loved.
2. It is important to note that there is a vast overlap
between individual wants, or better—want satisfiers,
and need satisfiers. When purchasing rice, a pizza to
go, a house light, a mobile phone voucher, a bus
ticket, a dwelling, or a car these wants will also act as
need satisfiers depending on the context. But the
overlap is by no means complete. Some wants can be
excessive or harmful—what Max-Neef refers to as
“violators” or “pseudo need-satisfiers.” Conversely,
many need satisfiers will not necessarily be wanted
and thus will not feature in consumer demand.
3. For example, Plato believed that the wealth of the
richest in society should not be more than four times
the wealth of the poorest, and Aristotle contended that
the relevant multiplier was five times (Pizzigati 2018).
4. Using the French “reference budget,” Concialdi
(2018) finds that this results in an affluence line of
59,500 EUR per annum of equivalized disposable
income – much lower than the UK estimate
presented above.
5. This was a study of Londoners, but elsewhere this
would likely not be regarded as a luxury.
6. A rough estimate: If we follow the G77 recommendation
of 1% of the GDP of the rich developed world to be
transferred to the rest of the world, then annual transfers
would amount to some US$542 billion a year, of which
the UK pro rata share would be some US$30 billion or
£23 billion. This amounts to half as much again as
raising the (much more generous) minimum level of UK
citizens, calculated above. If the rich in the UK had to
find another £23 billion a year, by how much would
that reduce the Medeiros maximum income level from
£150,000 a year? Further research on this is
urgently needed.
7. See http://www.democracy-international.org/final-
propositions-french-citizens-convention-climate.
Acknowledgements
I express my thanks to Marlyne Sahakian and an
anonymous reviewer, to the workshop in Geneva organ-
ized by the Sustainable Consumption Research and
Action Initiative (Europe), and to Anna Coote for many
discussions and insights.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
References
Alkire, S. 2002. Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability
Approach and Poverty Reduction. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Braybrooke, D. 1987. Meeting Needs. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Brock, G. 2009. Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buch-Hansen, H., and M. Koch. 2019. “Degrowth Through
Income and Wealth Caps?” Ecological Economics 160:
264–271. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.03.001.
Concialdi, P. 2018. “What Does It Mean to Be Rich?
Some Conceptual and Empirical Issues.” European
Journal of Social Security 20 (1): 3–20. doi:10.1177/
1388262718760911.
Coote, A. 2015. “People, Planet, Power: Toward a New
Social Settlement.” International Journal of Social
Quality 5 (1): 8–34. doi:10.3167/IJSQ.2015.050102.
Daly, H. 1977. Steady-State Economics: The Economics of
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth. San
Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
Daly, H. 2018. “Benjamin Kunkel: Interview with Herman
Daly.” New Left Review 109: 81–104.
Davis, A., D. Hirsch, M. Padley, and L. Marshall. 2015. “How
Much is Enough?” Reaching Social Consensus on Minimum
Household Needs. Loughborough: Loughborough
University, Centre for Research in Social Policy.
Davis, A., D. Hirsch, and M. Padley. 2014. A Minimum
Income Standard for the UK in 2014. York: Joseph
Rowntree Foundation and Loughborough University.
Davis, A., K. Hecht, T. Burchardt, I. Gough, D. Hirsch,
K. Rowlingson, and K. Summers. 2020. Living on
Different Incomes in London: Can a Public Consensus
Identify a “Riches Line?” London: Trust for London.
https://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/publications/can-
public-consensus-identify-a-riches-line/).
Dean, H. 2020. Understanding Human Need. 2nd ed.
Bristol (UK): Policy Press.
Deeming, C. 2011. “Determining Minimum Standards of
Living and Household Budgets: Methodological Issues.”
Journal of Sociology 47 (1): 17–34. doi:10.1177/
1440783310386825.
Defila, R., and A. Di Giulio. 2020. “The Concept of
‘Consumption Corridors’ Meets Society: How an Idea
for Fundamental Changes in Consumption is
Received.” Journal of Consumer Policy 43 (2): 315–344.
doi:10.1007/s10603-019-09437-w.
Di Giulio, A., and D. Fuchs. 2014. “Sustainable
Consumption Corridors: Concept, Objections, and
Responses.” GAIA 23 (3): 184–192. doi:10.14512/gaia.
23.S1.6.
Di Giulio, A., and R. Defila. 2019a. “Building the Bridge
Between Protected Needs and Consumption
Corridors.” Paper Presented at the Workshop on
Consumption Corridors, Geneva, April.
Di Giulio, A., and R. Defila. 2019b. “The ‘Good Life’ and
Protected Needs.” In The Routledge Handbook of Global
Sustainability Governance, edited by A. Kalfagianni, D.
Fuchs, and A. Hayden, 100–114. London: Routledge.
Dover, M. 2016. “Human Needs: Overview.” In The
Encyclopedia of Social Work, edited by C. Franklin.
SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY 217
New York: Oxford University Press and National
Association of Social Workers.
Doyal, L. 1995. “Needs, Rights, and Equity: More Quality
in Healthcare Rationing.” Quality in Health Care: QHC
4 (4): 273–283. doi:10.1136/qshc.4.4.273.
Doyal, L., and I. Gough. 1991. A Theory of Human Need.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Drewnowski, J. 1978. “The Affluence Line.” Social
Indicators Research 5 (3): 263–278.
Druckman, A., and T. Jackson. 2010. “The Bare
Necessities: How Much Household Carbon Do We
Really Need?” Ecological Economics 69 (9): 1794–1804.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.04.018.
Gasper, D. 1996. Needs and Basic Needs: A Clarification of
Foundational Concepts for Development Ethics and Policy.
The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies.
Gasper, D. 2009. “The Human and the Social: A
Comparison of the Discourses of Human Development,
Human Security and Social Quality.” International
Journal of Social Quality 1 (1): 91–108.
Gough, I. 2000. Global Capital, Human Needs and Social
Policies: Selected Essays, 1994–99. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Gough, I. 2014. “Lists and Thresholds: Comparing the
Doyal–Gough Theory of Human Need with
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach.” In Capabilities,
Gender, Equality: Towards Fundamental Entitlements,
edited by F. Comim and M. Nussbaum, 357–381.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gough, I. 2015. “Climate Change and Sustainable Welfare:
The Centrality of Human Needs.” Cambridge Journal of
Economics 39 (5): 1191–1214. doi:10.1093/cje/bev039.
Gough, I. 2017. Heat, Greed and Human Need: Climate
Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Guillen-Royo, M. 2016. Sustainability and Wellbeing:
Human-Scale Development in Practice. London: Routledge.
Habermas, J. 1987. Knowledge and Human Interests.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hirsch, F. 1977. Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Hirsch, D. 2017. “High Income Standard Calculation.”
Private correspondence to author, August 2017.
Holden, E., K. Linnerud, D. Banister, V. Schwanitz, and
A. Wierling. 2018. The Imperatives of Sustainable
Development: Needs, Justice, Limits. London: Routledge.
Jackson, T. 2009. Prosperity without Growth: Economics
for a Finite Planet. London: Earthscan.
Jackson, T. 2019. HM Treasury’s Decarbonisation of the UK
Economy and Green Finance Inquiry: Written Evidence
Submitted by Professor Tim Jackson, University of Surrey
(DUE0074), Guildford, September 22.
Kasser, T. 2011. “Capitalism and Autonomy.” In Human
Autonomy in Cross-Cultural Context, edited by
V. Chirkov, R. Ryan and K. Sheldon. Dordrecht:
Springer.
Koch, M., and O. Mont, eds. 2016. Sustainability and the
Political Economy of Welfare. London: Routledge.
Max-Neef, M. 1989. “Human Scale Development: An
Option for the Future.” Development Dialogue 1: 17–47.
Max-Neef, M. 1992. “Development and Human Needs.”
In Real-Life Economics: Understanding Wealth
Creation, edited by P. Ekins and M. Max-Neef,
197–214. London: Routledge.
Medeiros, M. 2006. “The Rich and Poor: The
Construction of an Affluence Line from the Poverty
Line.” Social Indicators Research 78 (1): 1–18. doi:10.
1007/s11205-005-7156-1.
Niemietz, K. 2010. “Measuring Poverty: Context-Specific
but Not Relative.” Journal of Public Policy 30 (3):
241–262. doi:10.1017/S0143814X10000103.
Nussbaum, M. 1993. “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach.” In The Quality of Life, edited by M.
Nussbaum and A. Sen, 242–269. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nussbaum, M. 2000. Women and Human Development: The
Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Nussbaum, M. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press.
O’Neill, D., A. Fanning, W. Lamb, and J. Steinberger.
2018. “A Good Life for All within Planetary
Boundaries.” Nature Sustainability 1 (2): 88–95. doi:10.
1038/s41893-018-0021-4.
O’Neill, J. 2011. “The Overshadowing of Needs.” In
Sustainable Development: Capabilities, Needs, and Well-
Being, edited by F. Rauschmayer, I. Omann, and J.
Fr€uhmann, 25–43. London: Routledge.
Pizzigati, S. 2018. The Case for a Maximum Wage.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Rao, N., and J. Min. 2018. “Decent Living Standards:
Material Prerequisites for Human Wellbeing.” Social
Indicators Research 138 (1): 225–244. doi:10.1007/s11205-
017-1650-0.
Rao, N., and S. Pachauri. 2017. “Energy Access and
Living Standards: Some Observations on Recent
Trends.” Environmental Research Letters 12 (2): 025011.
doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa5b0d.
Raworth, K. 2017. Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to
Think Like a 21st Century Economist. London: RH
Business Books.
Robeyns, I. 2018. “Having Too Much.” In Nomos LVI:
Wealth: Yearbook of the American Society for Political and
Legal Philosophy, edited by J. Knight and M. Schwartzberg,
1–44. New York: New York University Press.
Robeyns, I. 2019. “What, If Anything, is Wrong with
Extreme Wealth?” Journal of Human Development and
Capabilities 20 (3): 251–266. doi:10.1080/19452829.2019.
1633734.
Ryan, R., and A. Sapp. 2007. “Basic Psychological Needs: A
Self-Determination Theory Perspective on the Promotion
of Wellness across Development and Cultures.” In
Wellbeing in Developing Countries: From Theory to
Research, edited by I. Gough and J. McGregor, 71–92.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schor, J. 2010. Plenitude: The New Economics of True
Wealth. New York: Penguin Press.
Soper, K. 1993. “A Theory of Human Need: Review.”
New Left Review 197: 113–128.
Storms, B., T. Goedeme, K. Van den Bosch, and K. Devuyst.
2013. Towards a Common Framework for Developing
Cross-nationally Comparable Reference Budgets in Europe.
ImPRovE Methodological Paper No. 13/02. University of
Antwerp. doi:10.1177/138826271501700101.
Stott, R. 2006. “Implications for Health in a Low Carbon
(Contract and Converge) World.” Journal of
Epidemiology and Community Health 60: 828.
Townsend, P. 1979. Poverty in the United Kingdom: A
Survey of Household Resources and Standards of Living.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Veblen, T. 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An
Economic Study of the Evolution of Institutions. New
York: Macmillan.
218 I. GOUGH
Wilkinson, R., and K. Pickett. 2009. The Spirit Level: Why
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better. London:
Allen Lane.
Wiggins, D. 1987. “Essay 1: Claims of Need.” In Needs,
Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, 1–59.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wiggins, D. 2005. “An Idea We Cannot Do Without:
What Difference Will It Make (e.g., to Moral, Political
and Environmental Philosophy) to Recognize and Put
to Use a Substantial Conception of Need?” Royal
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 57: 25–50. doi:10.
1017/S1358246105057024.
SUSTAINABILITY: SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY 219
